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A B S T R A C T
Standardisation is key to shaping new technologies and supporting major ongoing trends, such as the increased
importance of platforms, developing ‘smart’ technologies and innovating large-scale complex systems.
Standardisation plays a key role in shaping the rules that govern these developments and their eﬀects on society.
Due to the large variety of actors involved in these trends, the associated standardisation processes are likely to
involve all three modes of standardisation identiﬁed in the literature: committee-based, market-based and
government-based. This multi-mode standardisation challenges the theoretical views on standardisation which
predominantly focus on one of the modes. In this paper, we review the existing literatures on individual modes
and on multi-mode standardisation. By recombining existing evidence, we generate new insights into multi-
mode standardisation processes. These ﬁrst insights relate to the contributions that each mode can make to such
processes’ outcomes and suggest that their impact depends on factors, such as their initiation’s timing and the
institutional context in which the standardisation process occurs. Moreover, we consider the conditions under
which actors can launch each mode. Based on our observations, we formulate an agenda for future research to
obtain a better understanding of multi-mode standardisation. We oﬀer recommendations for industry actors,
NGOs, researchers and policy makers involved in shaping technological and societal change.
1. Introduction
Standardisation can be critical in determining a technology’s success
and often plays a vital role in supporting major technological and so-
cietal trends. Many important ongoing developments, such as the
transformation towards a platform economy, making things ‘smart’ and
innovating large, complex systems rely on standardisation (e.g.
Featherston et al., 2016; Geels, 2004; Ho and O’Sullivan, 2017). Stan-
dardisation’s key aim is limiting the number of solutions when using
many diﬀerent options simultaneously is ineﬀective and ineﬃcient.
One would expect the standardisation world to adopt this approach to
its own processes and ensure that standardisation itself is ‘standard’.
However, closer inspection reveals that this is not the case.
Current literature is organised around three modes of standardisa-
tion: committee-based standardisation, sometimes referred to as de-jure
standardisation (e.g. Jain, 2012; Narayanan and Chen, 2012); market-
based standardisation, sometimes referred to as de-facto standardisa-
tion (e.g. Schilling, 2002; Suarez, 2004); and government-based stan-
dardisation (e.g. Büthe and Mattli, 2010). Extant literature describes
cases where these modes jointly contributed to the ﬁnal outcome (e.g.
Gao, 2014; Garud et al., 2002; von Burg, 2001), and shows that many
impactful standards (such as the ISO shipping container, GSM or
Ethernet) emerged in multi-mode standardisation processes, but pro-
vides limited theoretical insights into these processes. As we argue in
Section 2.1, multi-mode standardisation is likely to become increasingly
important in the future. Most (if not all) major ongoing trends, which
shape technology and society, bring together previously unrelated sta-
keholders from diﬀerent backgrounds (e.g. in terms of industry sector
and geography) (e.g. Kenney and Zysman, 2016; Porter and
Heppelmann, 2014). As they use standardisation to facilitate and co-
ordinate these developments, they are likely to bring diﬀerent stan-
dardisation ‘cultures’ and strategies to the table and employ the modes
of standardisation that they are familiar with, resulting in a large
number of multi-mode processes.
Despite this increasing importance of multi-mode standardisation, it
has received surprisingly little attention in research. The predominant
view in the literature (e.g. Leiponen, 2008; Schilling, 2002) assumes
that every standardisation process relies on only one of these three
modes. Although many historical cases (e.g. the market battle between
VHS and Betamax or ISO 9001’s committee-based development) are in
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line with this view, it leaves an increasing share of cases unexplained
(Section 2). In this review paper, we make four contributions towards
generating a better understanding of these trends and the associated
standardisation processes. First, we review existing literature and de-
rive the three ideal-typical modes of standardisation that drive the
emergence of standards (Section 3). Second, we summarise available
theory on multi-mode standardisation and identify its gaps (also Section
3). Third, we recombine evidence from existing literature to make some
ﬁrst steps in formulating additional theory on multi-mode standardi-
sation (Section 4). Fourth, we propose an agenda for research which
can add to a more complete understanding of the phenomenon (Section
5.1). Based on these ﬁndings, we also oﬀer recommendations, based on
the currently available evidence, for industry actors, NGOs, researchers
and policymakers in standard developing organisations (SDOs), in-
dustry associations and communities of practice involved in shaping
major technological trends (Section 5.2).
2. Trends in standardisation
Standardisation aims to resolve situations where involved actors
prefer a common solution to a problem, but have not yet agreed which
option to choose. For example, this can often be observed during the
development of technical speciﬁcations for new technologies with
network eﬀects. Such network eﬀects mean that the technology’s ben-
eﬁts for an individual actor increase along with the number of others
using the same technology. The conﬂicts arising between actors sup-
porting diﬀerent solutions have been modelled game-theoretically as
‘battle-of-the sexes’ games (see e.g. Belleﬂamme, 2002; Besen and
Farrell, 1994; Farrell and Saloner, 1988; Mattli and Büthe, 2003). These
battles can result in wars of attrition where actors block agreements in
the hope that the other side concedes (Farrell and Saloner, 1988; Farrell
and Simcoe, 2012). To establish a common solution, standardisation
pursues coordination between actors by developing solutions which are
then implemented by all of them (Farrell and Saloner, 1988; Farrell and
Simcoe, 2012). We group the literature on processes for establishing
common solutions around three modes of standardisation in which such
coordination occurs: (1) committee-based, (2) market-based and (3)
government-based (see Section 3 for a detailed discussion).
2.1. Complexity in standardisation
We observe several empirical cases of widely used and impactful
standards emerging from complex processes, where actors use diverse
strategies to inﬂuence the outcomes, involving multiple modes of
standardisation (see Table 1). Moreover, we expect the role of multi-
mode standardisation to increase in the future in line with several major
trends which underlie the increasing digitalisation of society: large
scale innovation of complex systems, the development of smart tech-
nologies, the increasing importance of platforms, growing demands for
sustainability and responsibility in global supply chains, and globali-
sation in general. All of these developments bring together a large
variety of previously unrelated actors, and rely on coordination be-
tween these actors to be able to function. Pursuing these changes is
beyond the capabilities of individual ﬁrms and even industries, re-
quiring actors to interact and/or cooperate across sectors, and exposing
them to new sets of stakeholders (Porter and Heppelmann, 2014).
Kenney and Zysman (2016) argue that these trends can even aﬀect
actors from all parts of society and require them to ﬁnd common so-
lutions, not only to technical questions, but also to non-technical issues.
Standardisation can be important in establishing these solutions and
getting them accepted (e.g. Featherston et al., 2016; Geels, 2004; Ho
and O’Sullivan, 2017; Schmidt and Werle, 1998). This implies that
standardisation is not only relevant to industry, but also to many other
stakeholders. For example, NGOs play an increasingly important role in
standardisation (Boström and Tamm Hallström, 2010). The EU’s Hor-
izon 2020 programme for funding research projects speciﬁcally
considers participation in standardisation as a research output
(European Commission, 2011a, 2011b; European Parliament and
Council of the European Union, 2013). Germany’s government also
operates a funding programme for scientists who work on incorporating
their research ﬁndings into standards (BMWi, 2016).
As the involved actors develop standards to support these trends or
cope with them, they are likely to base their approaches on standar-
disation ‘cultures’ that they are familiar with. These diﬀer greatly. For
example, the ICT sector has a standardisation ‘culture’ where consortia
and markets play a big role, whereas other sectors rely to a larger de-
gree on committee-based standardisation (e.g. Blind and Gauch, 2008).
The degree to which actors in standardisation rely on collaboration or
competition also varies widely across countries (Büthe and Mattli,
2011; Tate, 2001). The role of government in standardisation diﬀers as
well. The government plays a deﬁning role in Chinese standardisation
(e.g. Chuang, 2016; Gao et al., 2014; Gao, 2014), whereas the “New
Approach” in Europe aims to limit the inﬂuence of government on
technical details and depends on private stakeholders contributing their
expertise to standardisation (Borraz, 2007). This implies that standar-
disation processes, which bring together the diverse actors who are
involved in shaping these trends, will rely on multiple modes. Stan-
dardisation of the Internet of Things and smart manufacturing is an
example of an area driven jointly by players from the ICT ﬁeld and
traditional manufacturing industries and involves elements of all three
standardisation modes (see Ho and O’Sullivan, 2017; Lu et al., 2016).
Also, national standardisation strategies outline the relationship be-
tween government and the other modes of standardisation, for example
in China (CNIS, 2016), the Republic of Korea (Choi, 2016), the USA
(United States Standards Strategy Committee, 2015), the UK (CBI et al.,
n.d.), Germany (Deutsche Bundesregierung, 2009); France (Evrard,
2014), Austria (Österreichische Bundesregierung, 2016), and Russia
(RF Ministry of Industry Energy, 2008).
Given the increasing complexity in standardisation and the im-
portance of multi-mode standardisation for ongoing technical and so-
cietal developments, it is a phenomenon that warrants further in-
vestigation.
2.2. The predominant view on standardisation
Much of the existing literature assumes that standards are devel-
oped and diﬀused strictly within the boundaries of one mode (e.g.
Belleﬂamme, 2002; Blind et al., 2017; Chiao et al., 2007; Farrell and
Simcoe, 2012; Greenstein, 1992; Leiponen, 2008; Rosen et al., 1988;
Schilling, 2002; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010), and thus treats the
modes of standardisation as mutually exclusive. Typologies of stan-
dardisation are built on this premise and classify cases into the diﬀerent
modes without considering the possibility that some standardisation
processes may involve elements of several modes (e.g. Botzem and
Dobusch, 2012; Büthe and Mattli, 2011; p. 19; Büthe and Mattl, 2010;
David and Greenstein, 1990). Following from this, the literature on
success factors in standardisation is divided into diﬀerent streams of
research. The ﬁrst stream identiﬁes ways to inﬂuence processes within
standard developing organisations (SDOs) (e.g. Jain, 2012; Leiponen,
2008; Mattli and Büthe, 2003). Another stream focuses on success
factors for winning market battles (e.g. den Uijl, 2015; Schilling, 2002;
Suarez, 2004; van de Kaa et al., 2011; van den Ende et al., 2012). Work
on how actors can successfully inﬂuence government-based standardi-
sation is scarcer, although cases have been described (Gilmore et al.,
2006) and success factors for lobbying in general (e.g. Bouwen, 2002;
Klüver, 2011; Mahoney, 2007) are likely to apply.
This theoretical assumption of standardisation processes taking
place within one mode’s boundaries is supported by many empirical
cases. For example, ISO 9001 originated in the committee-based mode
(Tamm Hallström, 2004). Examples of the market-based mode include
the battle between AC and DC electricity in the 19th century (David,
1992; David and Bunn, 1988) and VHS vs. Betamax (Cusumano et al.,
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1992; Rosenbloom and Cusumano, 1987). Examples of purely govern-
ment-based standardisation can be found in Latin American milk safety
standards (Farina et al., 2005) and the French government’s deﬁnition
of standard measurements in the 18th century (Rosen et al., 1988). In
addition, the standardisation systems of the former Soviet Union (USSR
State Standards, 1976) and China before the mid-1980s (Chuang, 2016)
were built entirely on government-based standardisation.
Although there are thus cases supporting the focus on single modes,
relying on this view when analysing multi-mode standardisation cases,
such as the ones presented in Table 1, means treating elements of ad-
ditional modes as external inﬂuences. For example, Tamm Hallström
(2004) and Büthe and Mattli (2011) view government activities in ac-
counting standards as external to the standardisation process taking
place in committees. This approach may constrain a full understanding
of such cases, because multi-mode standardisation is characterised by
dynamic interactions between modes. In the remainder of this paper,
we review the available literature that can help us understand these
dynamics and recombine it to generate new insights. We also identify
the limitations of existing evidence, and outline an agenda for research
to obtain a more complete understanding of multi-mode standardisa-
tion processes.
3. Modes of standardisation
We now take a closer look at the three modes of standardisation
which represent ideal-typical models of standardisation processes. In
Section 3.1, we brieﬂy review the literature on these ideal-typical
modes to highlight their deﬁning features and provide the conceptual
background for the rest of the paper. In Section 3.2, we review extant
research on the interactions between these modes, and deviations from
these ideal-types. As indicated in Fig. 1, this body of work focuses on
speciﬁc pairs of modes. Because standardisation processes are hetero-
geneous, we also discuss the extent to which the modes of standardi-
sation are likely to form the basis for standardisation processes across
this diverse domain (Section 3.3).
Table 1
Overview of cases involving more than one mode of standardisation.
Combination of Modes Example Cases
Markets and Committees • Ethernet vs. other LAN technologies (von Burg, 2001)• Oﬃce document formats (Blind, 2011; Egyedi and Koppenhol, 2010)• Web-browsers (de Vries et al., 2008)• DVD (Vercoulen and van Wegberg, 1998)• Competition between internet telephony technologies (Vercoulen and van Wegberg, 1998)• Competition between 2G mobile telecommunications technologies in the USA (Funk and Methe, 2001; Gandal et al., 2003;
Pelkmans, 2001)
• USB vs. FireWire (van den Ende et al., 2012)• Wi-Fi vs. HomeRF (van den Ende et al., 2012)• Blu-Ray vs. HD-DVD (den Uijl and de Vries, 2013)• Competition between diﬀerent standards for Unix operating systems (Axelrod et al., 1995)• Standardisation of LED-lighting technology (LED Inside, 2010)
Governments and Committees • GSM (Bekkers, 2001; Pelkmans, 2001)• TD-SCDMA in China (Gao et al., 2014; Gao, 2014)• TCP/IP (Townes, 2012)• ISO Shipping Container (Egyedi, 2000; Egyedi and Spirco, 2011)• European container sizes for intermodal transport (Meyer, 2012)• Standards for digital and high-deﬁnition television (Meyer, 2012)• Requirements for medical devices in the EU (Frank, 2001)• Energy performance requirements for buildings in the Netherlands (de Vries and Verhagen, 2016)• European “New Approach” (Borraz, 2007)
Governments and Markets • Competition between railway track gauges (Puﬀert, 2002, 2000)• Global market battle between 2G mobile telecommunications technologies (Funk and Methe, 2001)• ADA programming language vs. alternatives (Rosen et al., 1988)
Markets, Committees and Governments • Competition between international accounting standards (Büthe and Mattli, 2011; Hail et al., 2010; Tamm Hallström, 2004)a• Internet protocols (Abbate, 2001)• CSR and environmental management systems (Delmas and Montiel, 2008; Moratis and Tatang Widjaja, 2014; Wätzold et al., 2001)b• Standards for Internet of Things and smart manufacturing (Lu et al., 2016)• Plugs for charging electric vehicles in Europe (Bakker et al., 2015)• Food quality and safety standards (Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008)• Antifouling paint for ships (Thompson Clarke Shipping Pty, 2017 ThoThompson Clarke Shipping Pty. Ltd. et al., n.d.)• Competition between units of measurement – SI and Imperial Measurement systems (Glazebrook, 1931; National Industry
Conference Board, 1921)
a Büthe and Mattli (2011) and Tamm Hallström (2004) ignore the role of markets in this case. Hail et al.’s (2010) case description focuses on the inﬂuence of governments and markets
while neglecting committees.
b Although these papers do not explicitly discuss committee-based standardisation, the presence of an ISO standard (ISO 26000) implies that committees played a role in this case.
Fig. 1. Literature on standardisation.
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3.1. Setting the background of ideal-typical modes of standardisation
Based on literature, we identify three ideal-typical modes of stan-
dardisation: committee-based, market-based and government-based.
These modes have three deﬁning characteristics: (1) the mechanisms
which result in the coordination that standardisation aims for and de-
scribe the fundamental relationships between actors in the process
(cooperation, competition, hierarchy); (2) the main actors involved
(private or public); and (3) the timing in the process (development or
diﬀusion – see below) when actors intervene and coordination occurs.
These three deﬁning characteristics lead to two additional distin-
guishing features of the ideal-typical modes: (1) individual actors’
avenues of inﬂuence on the process’s results and (2) the degree to which
standard development is inclusive or exclusive (see Botzem and
Dobusch, 2012). We summarise these features in Table 2 and explain
them in more detail in Sections 3.1.1–3.1.3.
Timing refers to the clearly discernible phases of standardisation
processes (e.g. de Vries, 2010; Lyytinen and King, 2006; Suarez, 2004).
We classify these phases in two overarching categories (in line with
Botzem and Dobusch, 2012; Weitzel et al., 2006). (1) standard devel-
opment when solutions that are intended as a standard are created, and
(2) standard diﬀusion which includes spreading information about a
new standard, encouraging its application in use, and its actual ac-
ceptance and implementation (see Rogers, 2003). Depending on the
mode of standardisation, coordination can occur in either of these
phases (see Table 2).
3.1.1. Characteristics of committee-based standardisation
Standardisation through cooperation usually takes place in com-
mittees of SDOs (e.g. the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) or ASTM International), consortia (e.g. the Blu-Ray Disc
Association), professional associations (e.g. IEEE), trade associations
(e.g. IATA), or open source initiatives.1 There, stakeholders collaborate
to deﬁne standards which propose one solution in the form of an ap-
proved document (Blind, 2006, 2002; Büthe and Mattli, 2010;
Gallagher, 2007; Hanseth and Monteiro, 1997; Narayanan and Chen,
2012; Rosen et al., 1988; Schmidt and Werle, 1998; Timmermans and
Epstein, 2010) – although the exact process varies among standardi-
sation organisations (e.g. Tate, 2001). Actors belonging to the private
sphere dominate committees (Büthe and Mattli, 2011, 2010) and any
interested stakeholder can join these committees in their ideal-typical
form, making the process ‘inclusive’ (Botzem and Dobusch, 2012).
In terms of timing, coordination in the committee-based mode takes
place during standard development. If diﬀerent options are proposed,
they are evaluated before a standard is approved and diﬀused (Jain,
2012). SDOs aim to deﬁne only one solution for each problem – a goal
they reach often but not always (Blind, 2011; Egyedi and Koppenhol,
2010). Using standards that were developed in committees is voluntary
(e.g. de Vries, 1999 Mattli and Büthe, 2003). Economic beneﬁts, such as
reduced transaction costs (e.g. Blind, 2004, 2002; Swann, 2010), and
various market demands (Brunsson et al., 2012) are important reasons
for their implementation. Other reasons for their implementation lie in
Table 2
Ideal-typical modes of standardisation – characteristics (source: authors’ own summary of literature).
Committee-Based Standardisation Market-Based Standardisation Government-Based Standardisation
Relationships between
actors
Coordination
mechanism
Coordination through cooperation between
stakeholders. Standards are developed in
committees and only diﬀused if members
agree on a common solution.
Solutions intended as a standard can be developed by
anyone. Coordination through competition between
solutions in the market, leading often (but not always)
to one de-facto standard.
Solutions intended as a standard can come
from various sources. Coordination through
governments using their hierarchical position
to impose these standards’ use on others.
Timing of coordination Coordination takes place during standard
development – only one solution is chosen to
enter the market.
Coordination takes place during diﬀusion – diﬀerent
standards are developed and compete with each other.
Governments can intervene in development
or mandate using an already developed
standard.
Main actors driving the
standardisation
process
Predominantly private Predominantly private Predominantly public
Stakeholders cooperating in committees; SDOs
providing a platform for standard
development.
Individual market actors inﬂuencing the outcome of the
market competition with their actions.
Governmental bodies developing standards
and/or enforcing their use.
Avenues of inﬂuence Participating in committees to inﬂuence
standards’ contents.
Engaging in the market to inﬂuence battles’ outcomes
by inﬂuencing decisive factors.
Inﬂuencing government decision-making
through lobbying or parliamentary
representatives.
Inclusiveness in
standard
development
High, any interested party can join a
committee.
Varies, some standard development venues are open;
access to others is restricted.
Medium, lobbying may require high eﬀort.
Examples of empirical
research
Leiponen (2008), Mattli and Büthe (2003),
Tamm Hallström and Boström (2010), Tate
(2001)
den Uijl (2015), Schilling (2002) Farina et al. (2005), Schmidt and Werle
(1998)
1 Characterisations of open source communities in the literature (e.g. de Vries et al.,
2008; West, 2007; West and O’Mahony, 2008) suggest that they exhibit all deﬁning
features of venues for committee-based standardisation (see Table 2 and this section),
even though they may not describe their work as ‘standardisation activities’ (see e.g.
Open Source Initiative, 2007). In addition, they also have some characteristics which set
them apart from more ‘traditional’ SDOs, e.g. in terms of intellectual property rules which
often allow actors to ‘fork’ code to create new open source initiatives, or in terms of the
length of development cycles. These diﬀerences mean that standards, which emerge from
open source initiatives, are often more ‘ﬂuid’ than those that are developed in traditional
SDOs.
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the path taken in standard development (Botzem and Dobusch, 2012;
Markus et al., 2006; Tamm Hallström, 2004) – e.g. the cooperative,
inclusive development process can give standards legitimacy which
supports their implementation (Botzem and Dobusch, 2012; Tamm
Hallström and Boström, 2010). However, implementation of standards
is not self-evident and may be hindered by several barriers (de Vries
et al., 2009).
Despite this, studies that investigate committee-based standards’
diﬀusion are scarce compared to research on their development. Since
coordination takes place before a standard enters the market in com-
mittee-based standardisation, literature focuses on standard develop-
ment in these organisations (see e.g. Belleﬂamme, 2002; Goluchowicz
and Blind, 2011; Mattli and Büthe, 2003) and often sees a standard’s
release as the end-point of the process.
3.1.2. Characteristics of market-based standardisation
Literature on market-based standardisation describes how battles
between diﬀerent technologies result in de-facto standards.2 These
technologies and their proponents compete in the market until an
equilibrium is reached (Gallagher, 2007; Narayanan and Chen, 2012;
Rosen et al., 1988; Schilling, 2002; Schmidt and Werle, 1998; Shapiro
and Varian, 1999; Suarez, 2004; Tassey, 2000; Timmermans and
Epstein, 2010; van de Kaa et al., 2011). Such battles usually result in
one solution emerging as de-facto standard (Cusumano et al., 1992; de
Vries, 2006; de Vries and Hendrikse, 2001; Schilling, 2002) due to a
bandwagon eﬀect (Belleﬂamme, 2002; Delcamp and Leiponen, 2014;
Farrell and Simcoe, 2012; Geroski, 2000). However, there are also cases
where several standards continue existing in parallel and where no
coordination is reached (de Vries et al., 2011; Techatassanasoontorn
and Suo, 2011).
Competition during the diﬀusion phase, i.e. after several solutions
intended as a standard have been developed, is thus the driving force
for coordination between actors in market-based standardisation.3 This
competition is predominantly driven by actors from the private sphere
(Büthe and Mattli, 2011, pp. 25–29; Büthe and Mattli, 2010). Because
standards can be developed by anyone and are often proprietary, in-
clusiveness in standard development is generally regarded as low in
market-based standardisation (Botzem and Dobusch, 2012; Egyedi,
2003).
3.1.3. Characteristics of government-based standardisation
Governments can use their hierarchical position to intervene in
standardisation, and regulation is an important way of developing and
diﬀusing standards (Khemani and Shapiro, 1993).4 Governments can
impose mandatory use of standards that were developed elsewhere
(Rosen et al., 1988), or can also develop standards themselves and
make their use mandatory (Blind et al., 2017; Büthe and Mattli, 2011;
pp. 20–23; Büthe and Mattli, 2010; Farina et al., 2005; Narayanan and
Chen, 2012; Schmidt and Werle, 1998; Timmermans and Epstein,
2010). Coordination in government-based standardisation can thus
occur in either of the phases, i.e. standard development or standard
diﬀusion. Contrary to committee- and market-based standardisation,
government-based standardisation is dominated by public actors who
have the authority to impose a standard’s use (Büthe and Mattli, 2011;
pp. 20–23; Büthe and Mattli, 2010). Private actors can therefore not
inﬂuence coordination directly but only through lobbying5 which may
require high eﬀort and may be ineﬀective. We therefore classify gov-
ernment-based standardisation’s inclusiveness (see Botzem and
Dobusch, 2012) as medium compared to the other two modes.
Whether governments should play such a role at all in standardi-
sation is a controversial question. Blind et al. (2017) ﬁnd that such an
intervention’s eﬀects on innovation depends on the degree of techno-
logical uncertainty in the market. In general, some researchers justify
government-intervention because of the beneﬁts of compatibility
compared to an alternative situation where there is no common stan-
dard (e.g. Bekkers, 2001; Funk and Methe, 2001; Pelkmans, 2001).
Others argue that avoiding competition between solutions removes the
incentive for innovation that would otherwise be needed to ensure a
solution’s competitive edge and that governments should therefore
carefully weigh the beneﬁts and costs of intervening on a case-by-case
basis (e.g. Cabral and Kretschmer, 2007; Cabral and Salant, 2014;
Gandal et al., 2003). It has therefore been proposed that some of the
ways in which government can intervene in standardisation that are
described in Section 3.2 are preferable to the ideal-typical government-
based standardisation through hierarchical means. This debate mainly
focuses on compatibility standardisation, but de Vries and Verhagen
(2016) show that government-based standardisation for energy eﬃ-
ciency can also simultaneously stimulate innovation and address soci-
etal issues. In other areas (e.g. safety or consumer information stan-
dards), government intervention may also be justiﬁed in cases of
market failure when private actors would settle on solutions which
carry negative externalities.
3.2. Existing literature on multi-mode standardisation
The modes of standardisation presented in Section 3.1 present ideal-
types of standardisation processes. However, as we argued in Section 2,
there are an increasing number of standardisation cases which are not
covered by these ideal-types. Despite this, few sources provide detailed
case descriptions which clearly show the dynamics in such cases and an
even smaller number oﬀers theory that integrates the diﬀerent modes.
Where there is theory on multi-mode standardisation, this combines
elements of pairs of modes but we are not aware of theory that in-
tegrates all three modes. We provide an overview of the literature with
detailed case descriptions and/or theoretical contributions about multi-
mode standardisation processes in Tables 3A, 3B and 3C and summarise
these theoretical contributions in Sections 3.2.1–3.2.3.
3.2.1. Combinations of market-based and committee-based standardisation
When market-based and committee-based standardisation jointly
drive standardisation, elements of cooperation and competition as well
as the other characteristics of these modes (see Table 2) are combined.
Work that considers these combinations theoretically is either based on
(1) the assumption that elements of committee- and market-based
standardisation occur sequentially or (2) a dynamic interaction be-
tween elements of these modes.
The ﬁrst type is considered by Axelrod et al. (1995), Markus et al.
(2006) and van den Ende et al. (2012). Axelrod et al. (1995) observe
that solutions which compete against each other in market battles are
often developed in cooperation between actors in diﬀerent consortia.6
In such standardisation processes, the number of potential solutions is
therefore ﬁrst reduced through cooperation in diﬀerent consortia before
2 Market mechanisms also drive the emergence of dominant designs and platforms.
Many authors see these and de-facto standards as diﬀerent concepts (den Uijl, 2015;
Gallagher, 2007) although, according to den Uijl (2015), the processes in which they
emerge are similar.
3 Where literature discusses standard development for the market-based mode, it
usually refers to processes in consortia, indicating some degree of overlap with the
committee-based mode − see Section 3.2.1.
4 According to Lessig, 2000; Lessig, 1999 idea that ‘code is law’, private actors who
deﬁne architectures for software and the internet may occupy similar hierarchical posi-
tions as governments. This is because the architectures that they develop can restrict or
encourage certain behaviour in similar ways to rules imposed by governments. Much of
what we write in this paper about government-based standardisation might therefore also
apply to these actors. However, exploring this is beyond the scope of our paper.
5 Lobbying has been investigated in depth from a political science perspective (e.g.
Bouwen, 2002 Klüver, 2011; Mahoney, 2007), and from the economic regulatory capture
(e.g. Dal Bó, 2006; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991) and regulatory relief (e.g. Schmidt, 2002;
Wätzold et al., 2001) perspectives.
6 Following our deﬁnition of the committee-based mode, consortia can be seen as a
form of committee because they also develop standards in cooperation.
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a market-battle leads to the emergence of a commonly accepted stan-
dard. In these cases, Axelrod et al. (1995) expect actors to join consortia
which are large but where only few competitors are present in order to
maximise the chances of the consortium’s solution becoming the stan-
dard while enabling actors to reap the beneﬁts of that solution. Fur-
thermore, events in a consortium’s cooperative coordination process
also aﬀect the chances of the resulting solution being selected in the
market (Markus et al., 2006; van den Ende et al., 2012).
Other work questions this sequential occurrence of both modes, and
considers a more dynamic interaction. Farrell and Saloner (1988) de-
velop a game-theoretic model to investigate the interplay between
markets and committees. In this model, actors decide whether to adopt
a solution in the market or negotiate in a committee in each round, and,
if they negotiate, whether to insist on their preferred solution or accept
the proposed alternative. When comparing this combined model to
models of pure market- or committee-based standardisation, Farrell and
Saloner (1988) ﬁnd that its payoﬀs for participants outperform those
that can be achieved in either alternative. van Wegberg (2004) ﬁnds
this only to be true when switching costs are relatively low. High
switching costs are likely to lead to purely market- or committee-based
standardisation (van Wegberg, 2004). In addition, standardisation is
more likely to include both market- and committee-based elements in
industries that are both complex and dynamic (Vercoulen and van
Wegberg, 1998). In these cases, the process can either start in the
market and involve committees in later stages or vice versa (Vercoulen
and van Wegberg, 1998).
3.2.2. Combinations of government-based and committee-based
standardisation
Cases involving elements of government-based and committee-
based standardisation combine elements of cooperation and hierarchy
as well as other characteristics of these modes (see Table 2). Literature
shows very diverse examples of cases where governments intervened in
committee-based standardisation (see Tables 1 and 3B). Such inter-
ventions deviate from what would be expected under the ideal-types of
committee-based and government-based standardisation presented in
Section 3.1 and take two basic forms. (1) Government can use hier-
archical means to shape the outcome of committee-based standardisa-
tion (referred to as a ‘hard-law approach’ by Meyer (2012)) and (2)
government can employ non-hierarchical means to intervene in com-
mittees (referred to as an ‘entrepreneurial approach’ by Meyer (2012)),
introducing a powerful actor into the committee-based mode. Such a
powerful actor does not exist in the ideal-typical form of committee-
based standardisation and violates the expectation that governments
rely on hierarchy in standardisation.
Governments in Europe, the USA and China have all been shown to
Table 3A
Literature on the interaction between markets and committees.
Combination of
Modes
Paper Brief Summary Empirical Grounding Theory about
Multiple Modes
Geographical
Context
Industry Context
Market/Committee von Burg (2001) Ethernet case Individual case No Mainly USA IT
Garud et al. (2002) Java case Individual case No Global IT
Blind (2011), Egyedi
and Koppenhol (2010)
Oﬃce documents case Individual case No Global IT
van den Ende et al.
(2012)
USB vs. Firewire, Wi-Fi vs.
HomeRF cases
Individual cases Yes Global IT
Vercoulen and van
Wegberg (1998)
DVD& internet telephony cases Individual cases Yes Global IT, consumer
electronics, telecom
Farrell and Saloner
(1988)
Game-theoretic model of strategies
in markets and committees
n/a Yes n/a n/a
van Wegberg (2004) Economic model of interaction
between market and committees
3 case-examples to
illustrate model
Yes Global IT, consumer
electronics, telecom
Axelrod et al. (1995) Theory of actors’ choice between
competing committees
Individual case Yes Global IT
Markus et al. (2006) VIS standardisation in US
residential mortgage industry
Individual case Yes USA IT
Table 3B
Literature on the interaction between governments and committees.
Combination of
Modes
Paper Brief Summary Empirical Grounding Theory about
Multiple Modes
Geographical
Context
Industry Context
Government/
Committee
Bekkers (2001) GSM case Individual case No Europe Telecom
Pelkmans (2001) GSM case Individual case No Europe Telecom
Gao (2014) TD-SCMDA case Individual case No China Telecom
Townes (2012) TCP/IP case Individual case No Mainly USA IT
Egyedi and Spirco
(2011), Egyedi (2000)
ISO shipping container case Individual case No Global Transportation
Büthe and Mattli (2011) International accounting
standards case
Individual case No Global Financial services
Tamm Hallström (2004) International accounting
standards case
Individual case No Global Financial services
NIST (2010) Results from survey among
practitioners
Survey among
experts, non-
academic
(Yes) USA none
Gao et al. (2014) TD-SCMDA case Individual case Yes China Telecom
Meyer (2012) Study of government
intervention in standardisation
Individual case Yes Europe Transportation, telecom,
IT
Borraz (2007) New Approach Individual case Yes Europe, France None
Blind and Mangelsdorf
(2016)
Study of reasons for
participating in SDOs
Survey among
companies
Yes Germany Manufacturing
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intervene in committee-based standardisation through hierarchical
means (Bekkers, 2001; Borraz, 2007; Gao et al., 2014; Meyer, 2012;
Pelkmans, 2001). When doing so, governments may support a favoured
solution (e.g. in the Chinese TD-SCDMA case (Gao et al., 2014; Gao,
2014)). Such support may even go as far as denying visas to ISO-com-
mittee delegates (Kennedy, 2006). Governments see such interventions
in standardisation as a means to promote national industries (Gao et al.,
2014; Gao, 2014). Alternatively, governments can set broad aims and
objectives where they lack the means (e.g. expertise) to reach their
goals and leave the technical details to experts in committees. An ex-
ample of this type of intervention is the European “New Approach”
where European SDOs develop standards on request of the European
Commission (Borraz, 2007). Meeting these standards gives actors a
presumption of conforming to the legislation (Borraz, 2007). Blind and
Mangelsdorf (2016) identify this type of labour division as a strong
incentive for industry actors to participate in SDOs, because it allows
them to inﬂuence the implementation of the regulation that they need
to adhere to. Meyer (2012) found such ‘hard-law’ interventions with
more or less prominent hierarchical elements to have severe drawbacks.
In the cases that he studied, the prospect of a committee-based standard
being enforced as a mandatory solution mobilised actors who would
otherwise not have participated in standard development. This made it
more diﬃcult or even impossible to ﬁnd a commonly acceptable solu-
tion in these committees (Meyer, 2012).
Instead of this ‘hard-law’ approach, Meyer (2012) advocates ‘en-
trepreneurial’ government interventions in committee-based standar-
disation. In this second type of intervention, governmental actors can
play various roles that facilitate the cooperative coordination process.
These activities can aim to actively promote one solution in committees
and control their work to some extent (Gao et al., 2014), but may also
be of a more advisory or observing nature (NIST, 2010). Speciﬁcally,
they include placing standardisation issues on SDOs’ agendas (Gao
et al., 2014; Meyer, 2012); mediating between actors in the process
(Bekkers, 2001; Gao et al., 2014; Meyer, 2012; NIST, 2010; Pelkmans,
2001); facilitating the standardisation process, e.g. by providing ﬁ-
nancial support (Gao et al., 2014; NIST, 2010); or protecting the results
of the process from contestation (Bekkers, 2001; Meyer, 2012;
Pelkmans, 2001). Furthermore, governments can also inﬂuence the
context in which standardisation takes place (sometimes unin-
tentionally), thereby creating conditions that favour certain solutions
(see Egyedi, 2000; Townes, 2012 for examples).
The literature comes to diﬀerent conclusions regarding the extent to
which such interventions facilitate the standardisation process. For
example, Pelkmans’s (2001) analysis of GSM’s development places a
large emphasis on the European Commission’s role in making the case
successful whereas Bekkers (2001) sees other factors as more im-
portant. Meyer (2012) ﬁnds that all ways of ‘entrepreneurial’ govern-
ment intervention in SDOs contribute to successful standardisation
whereas American standardisation professionals are critical about
agenda-setting by government, and prefer the topics of SDOs’ work
agendas to be determined by private actors (NIST, 2010). However,
Meyer (2012) also found that such ‘entrepreneurial’ government in-
terventions in standardisation committees can only be successful if they
happen early enough in the process, implying that governments need
standardisation foresight (see Goluchowicz and Blind, 2011) if they aim
to use these means of intervention.
3.2.3. Combinations of government-based and market-based
standardisation
Where the government-based and market-based modes jointly
occur, elements of hierarchy and competition and their associated
characteristics (see Table 2) drive the standardisation process. Similar
to the interventions in the committee-based mode, the literature
documents government intervention in market-based standardisation
using hierarchical and non-hierarchical means. By using their hier-
archical position to mandate a speciﬁc solution’s use, governments canTa
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cut market battles short or prevent them from occurring altogether
(Cabral and Kretschmer, 2007; Cabral and Salant, 2014; den Uijl, 2015;
Gandal et al., 2003; van de Kaa et al., 2011 – also see Tables 1 and 3C
for examples). Whether governments should intervene in this manner is
a topic of contention in the literature. Some authors highlight the
beneﬁts related to compatibility, innovation and social welfare whereas
others claim that government intervention impacts negatively on in-
novation (see Section 3.1.3).
Hierarchical interventions can only be used to end a market battle at
the national (or – in the case of Europe – regional) level. At the global
level, there usually is no government with a hierarchical position to
make binding decisions for others. In global standard battles, govern-
ments using their hierarchical positions to mandate solutions for big
national markets nevertheless send an important signal to other actors
that this solution will have a substantial installed base, thus giving it an
edge in the battle (Funk and Methe, 2001). Additionally, governments
can also intervene in national-level market battles using non-hier-
archical means. One way of doing so is developing voluntary standards
which then compete against others, such as the EMAS environmental
management standard (Delmas and Montiel, 2008; Wätzold et al.,
2001). This may be accompanied by granting relief from certain reg-
ulatory requirements to parties that implement the standard to en-
courage its use (Wätzold et al., 2001). Another way of intervening in
market battles with non-hierarchical means is using public procurement
to build a solution’s installed base (Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Rosen
et al., 1988). This is likely to be particularly eﬀective in areas such as
defence or medical care, where governments purchase goods and ser-
vices in large quantities, and relies on elements of the market-based
mode, giving the government no additional inﬂuence beyond that of an
important player in the market.
3.3. Heterogeneity of standards and multi-mode standardisation
The examples and literature cited so far show that there are many
potential relationships, interactions and interdependences in standar-
disation processes. Furthermore, standards themselves are also very
diverse: They can apply to either the company, local, national or
transnational levels. In addition, they diﬀer in many other aspects, such
as (1) the industry sector(s) for which they are relevant; (2) their eco-
nomic functions (e.g. compatibility or safety, see Blind, 2004); (3)
whether they address products, services or processes (see Tassey,
2000); (4) whether their scopes cover small technical details or archi-
tectures for entire systems; and (5) the uncertainty and complexity of
the technology that they relate to (see Blind et al., 2017; de Vries,
1999). Standards are therefore extremely heterogeneous. The stakes
involved in their development and the characteristics of the involved
actors are likely to depend on the standard’s attributes. This implies a
vast variety in standardisation processes with very case-speciﬁc dy-
namics and interactions. How exactly these dynamics play out in a
process depends on the participating stakeholders, their interests and
their strategies to attain these interests.
Nevertheless, the modes of standardisation introduced above form
the foundation of these processes. Standardisation processes in all areas
have in common that actors would beneﬁt from a common solution but
have diﬀerent preferences. We are not aware of literature that proposes
other mechanisms to achieve the required coordination than coopera-
tion, competition and hierarchy. This means that, regardless of a
standardisation process’s speciﬁcs, it will be based on one or multiple
modes. Since the trends identiﬁed in Section 2.1, which lead to in-
creasing complexity in standardisation, aﬀect many diﬀerent settings,
we expect multi-mode standardisation to become increasingly common
across the heterogeneous domain of standardisation.
Tables 3A, 3B and 3C show that there is a lack of work that studies
the combination of all three standardisation modes7 and a relative
scarcity of work providing theoretical insights about multi-mode stan-
dardisation (15 out of 33 studies). These tables also show two strong
biases in this literature towards the IT and telecommunications sectors
on the one hand and Europe and the US on the other hand. Literature on
multi-mode standardisation therefore still has substantial gaps, because
it only covers a small range of standardisation ‘cultures’. These two
biases deserve closer attention.
Blind et al. (2017) ﬁnd technological uncertainty to be a key ele-
ment in determining the eﬀectiveness of committee- and government-
based standardisation. While this ﬁnding applies to single-mode stan-
dardisation, it highlights the technological context’s importance for
standardisation in general. A generalisable theory about multi-mode
standardisation therefore requires considering diﬀerent technological
contexts and sectors. The predominance of IT and telecommunications
in the literature raises the question whether multi-mode standardisation
occurs in other sectors and technological contexts to the same degree.
Markets play an important role in IT-related ﬁelds (see Section 2), but
this does not explain why these ﬁelds also dominate the literature on
the combination between governments and committees. We observe
that the cases of government-committee interaction documented in the
literature occurred in key national industries that are heavily regulated8
or have a history of state ownership (e.g. the telecommunications sector
– see Schmidt and Werle, 1998). Even if government intervention in
standardisation were to only occur in such sectors, this leaves a gap in
terms of sectors covered. We would then expect multi-mode standar-
disation with government involvement to also occur, e.g., in the
healthcare, food and ﬁnancial services sectors. This expectation is in
line with existing evidence. NIST (2010) mentions examples of gov-
ernment intervention in healthcare and nuclear standardisation. In the
European Union, government involvement in standardisation exists in
all major areas as documented by the “New Approach” standardisation
requests in CEN/CENELEC’s 2017 work programme (CEN/CENELEC,
2017).
Given the importance of the institutional context in government
activities but also in shaping markets and committees (Tate, 2001), we
also see that the literature is biased in its geographic coverage. Our
discussion in Section 2.1 shows that multi-mode standardisation exists
in various political settings, such as in Europe, the USA and more re-
cently China, but also that substantial diﬀerences appear to exist in how
such multi-mode standardisation manifests itself in these contexts. Si-
milar diﬀerences can be expected in other countries, e.g. Japan, the
Republic of Korea or various developing countries.
We expect that the underlying characteristics of multi-mode stan-
dardisation apply regardless of the exact type of standard. Nevertheless,
how they translate into the speciﬁc dynamics of a standardisation
process is likely to depend on many factors. The biases in the literature
on which we base our insights therefore present a limitation of our
further discussion in that regard and present an important opportunity
for future research.
4. Achieving coordination in multi-mode standardisation
As outlined in the Section 2, achieving coordination between actors
who would beneﬁt from using a common solution to a problem, but
may have diﬀerent preferences for this solution, is a key aim of stan-
dardisation. While the literature is very clear about how this goal can be
reached in single-mode standardisation, our discussion in Section 3.3
shows that substantial gaps still exist which limit our understanding of
7 This is despite our observation in Table 1 that inﬂuential standards in various areas
emerged from such processes.
8 Although IT is not heavily regulated in general, all IT-related cases with government
involvement in our literature overview have a link to the defence sector.
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coordination in multi-mode standardisation. Filling these gaps requires
further research (see Section 5.1), but we can gain initial insights by
recombining existing ﬁndings and theorising based on cases that so far
have only been considered individually. We do so by relying on an
inductive logic and base our insights on the evidence that has already
been published, without a pre-conceived theoretical lens.
In Section 4.1, we consider how standardisation ‘cultures’ emerge
and are maintained. Section 4.2 examines how individual actors can
activate speciﬁc new modes of standardisation, given this background.
Section 4.3 focuses on timing in multi-mode standardisation, and Sec-
tion 4.4 looks at the interactions between modes that drive the out-
comes of a standardisation process. Combined, these observations
imply that multi-mode standardisation is an ongoing process without a
clear end point − an idea that we explore in Section 4.5.
4.1. Emergence and maintenance of standardisation ‘Cultures’
As outlined earlier, approaches towards standardisation diﬀer con-
siderably between industry sectors and also between countries (Blind
and Gauch, 2008; Büthe and Mattli, 2011; Hawkins, 1999; Tate, 2001).
This means that in each sector and country common understandings
about the ‘rules of setting the rules’, i.e. about how standards usually
emerge and what is seen as a legitimate standard (see Botzem and
Dobusch, 2012; Tamm Hallström and Boström, 2010), are likely to
exist. An important element of such implicit rules is the roles that co-
operation, competition and hierarchy usually play during a standardi-
sation process.
How such implicit rules emerge may be explained by Fligstein and
McAdam’s (2012) strategic action ﬁeld theory. According to this theory,
actors establishing new ﬁelds attempt to shape the ﬁeld according to
their preferences in dynamic processes. These processes result in a
settlement which includes the ﬁeld’s rules of operation. We expect such
a process to also take place when standardisation activities ﬁrst emerge
in a country or in an industry sector, i.e. when a new standardisation
ﬁeld emerges.
As Fligstein and McAdam (2012) note, such processes are also in-
ﬂuenced by the new ﬁeld’s environment. In the standardisation context,
at least three factors are likely to be particularly important: (1) At the
national level, standardisation often relates to the ‘variety of capitalism’
in a particular country (Tate, 2001). Depending on how business is
usually conducted in countries, actors also make diﬀerent uses of
standardisation as a tool (Tate, 2001) and require diﬀerent types of
legitimacy to see a standard as an acceptable solution (see Botzem and
Dobusch, 2012; Tamm Hallström and Boström, 2010). This is likely to
inﬂuence their activities in setting up new standardisation ﬁelds. (2)
Related to this point, the legal framework and other existing rules (e.g.
industry codes of practice) also shape the way in which the modes of
standardisation are typically used. For example, the European Union’s
“New Approach” (see Borraz, 2007) sets a clear framework for the
relationship between committee- and government-based standardisa-
tion in certain areas. New standardisation eﬀorts in areas covered by
such legal frameworks are therefore likely to reﬂect the provisions
therein. (3) Following Blind et al.’s (2017) ﬁndings about the inﬂuence
of technological uncertainty on whether government- or committee-
based standardisation deliver better results, this is also likely to aﬀect
the emergence of a standardisation ‘culture’. They argue that high
technological uncertainty is also linked to market uncertainty, implying
that the market-based mode may gain a more prominent role in stan-
dardising technologically uncertain ﬁelds. On the other hand, low
technological and market uncertainty may facilitate standardisation in
committees and the government-based mode.
Once established, these rules are likely to be enforced by powerful
actors in the ﬁeld and/or governments (see Fligstein and McAdam,
2012) but also to some extent by path-dependence – i.e. actors might
stick to approaches to standardisation that have worked in the past,
even though better alternatives may be available. Deviating from these
rules by activating modes of standardisation that are not yet involved in
a ﬁeld is hence relatively diﬃcult. Nevertheless, doing so can be a good
strategic move, as it can oﬀer actors additional avenues to inﬂuence
standardisation. Furthermore, external shocks, such as technological
change and resulting mergers of ﬁelds (e.g. because of ICT being in-
tegrated into many areas), may put a ﬁeld in crisis (see Fligstein and
McAdam, 2012). Under such circumstances, a new settlement about
these ‘rules of setting the rules’ may be required. This leads to a dy-
namic process, similar to the one that occurs when the ﬁeld is initially
established, to determine new commonly accepted standardisation
practices.
4.2. Activating modes of standardisation
We examine how (easily) modes that are normally not involved in a
ﬁeld can be activated. Doing so may provide actors with new strategic
options but is subject to certain constraints. Below, we discuss the ac-
tivation of elements of committee-, market-based (Section 4.2.1), and
government-based standardisation (Section 4.2.2). We summarise the
key elements of this discussion in Table 4.
4.2.1. Activating market-based and committee-based standardisation
Market-based and committee-based standardisation are pre-
dominantly driven and activated by private actors (see Table 2). Farrell
and Saloner (1988) assume that each private actor has a choice of
joining committees or adopting a solution in the market to signal their
commitment. This implies that elements of market-based or committee-
based standardisation are activated by the ﬁrst actor who makes a
unilateral decision to seek competition and/or cooperation with others.
Indeed, some of the cases cited earlier support this expectation. In the
US 2G mobile communication case, Qualcomm initiated a market battle
by introducing its solution in the market to compete with the result of
Table 4
Activating modes of standardisation.
Committee-Based Standardisation Market-Based Standardisation Government-Based Standardisation
Activator Any actor who initiates a
standardisation committee.
Any actor who releases a solution
intended as standard into the market.
Only governmental actors can activate elements of
government-based mode. Private actors can lobby them.
Motivations for activation Increasing the activator’s inﬂuence on the standardisation process. Following a policy-related rationale for intervening.
Conditions for successful
activation and contribution
to process
Willingness to cooperate and
suﬃcient expertise to contribute in
committees.
Producers need suﬃcient resources to
release solutions into the market.
Governments can become active out of their own volition or
if convinced by private actors. Several factors help private
actors to convince governments:
Convincing others to also participate. Standard users must be willing to adopt
solutions given risk of incurring
switching costs.
• Ability to provide relevant information
• Membership of larger groups
• Salience of cause to government
• Signalling credible threats
• Having ties to government
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committee-based standardisation (Funk and Methe, 2001; Pelkmans,
2001). In the LAN case, several parties engaged in market-based stan-
dardisation before any result had been obtained in committees (von
Burg, 2001). In the Java case, Sun activated the committee-based mode
by proposing Java as a solution in ISO standardisation (Garud et al.,
2002).
These observations make it seem relatively easy for any private
actor to invoke elements of market- and/or committee-based standar-
disation. However, this might be more diﬃcult in reality. When actors
try to activate elements of a mode that are usually not involved in
standardisation in their institutional context, they might encounter
strong resistance. For example, when they involve committees in set-
tings where standards are usually determined in markets, they need to
mobilise other actors to cooperate. Activating competition in a stan-
dardisation process where standards are usually set through coopera-
tion may undermine the (input) legitimacy which Botzem and Dobusch
(2012) and Tamm Hallström and Boström (2010) see as important for
standardisation to successfully reach coordination.
Such invocations of a new mode are akin to ‘innovative action’ in
Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) strategic action ﬁeld theory which may
cause an ‘episode of contention’ in a settled ﬁeld. Whether such action
achieves its desired outcome depends on many factors, such as its
supporters’ strength and positions in the ﬁeld or the opponents’ re-
sponses (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). In these contexts, individual
actors can only shape the rules if they are suﬃciently strong and na-
vigate the ﬁeld well (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Applying Fligstein
and McAdam’s (2012) theory to standardisation therefore suggests that
actors can only successfully introduce elements of market-based and/or
committee-based standardisation if they are in a strong enough position
to do so. Unfortunately, extant literature that we are aware of does not
provide suﬃcient evidence about the exact circumstances when this is
likely to be successful. Consequently, this is a topic for future research.
4.2.2. Activating government-based standardisation
Contrary to committee- and market-based standardisation, govern-
ment-based standardisation is driven by public actors (see Table 2).
Only governmental actors can thus invoke elements of government-
based standardisation themselves. Private actors who want elements of
the government-based mode to be involved must therefore ﬁrst con-
vince the government to intervene. Regardless of whether governments
become active out of their own volition or because private actors
convince them, the cases documented in literature (see Tables 3B and
3C) suggest that governments will only do so if they see wider policy
implications beyond the standard itself. Examples of such policy goals
in past cases include building the European Single market (Bekkers,
2001; Borraz, 2007; Pelkmans, 2001), supporting defence activities
(Rosen et al., 1988), ensuring ﬁnancial markets’ stability (Büthe and
Mattli, 2011; Hail et al., 2010; Tamm Hallström, 2004), promoting
energy eﬃciency (de Vries and Verhagen, 2016), and promoting na-
tional industries (Gao et al., 2014; Gao, 2014).
This implies that private actors must provide a clear policy-related
rationale to persuade governments to intervene. Both cases of successful
and failed attempts to involve government have been documented, for
example by David (1992), David and Bunn (1988), Gao et al. (2014),
and Gao (2014). Standardisation literature oﬀers no insights into the
reasons for these successes or failures, but the ﬁndings in other streams
of literature may apply in this context. Literature on lobbying and
regulatory capture argues that private actors who successfully convince
governments of a point of view are those who (1) can provide in-
formation that is needed by governmental actors (Bouwen, 2002; Dal
Bó, 2006); (2) belong to larger groups arguing for the same cause
(Klüver, 2011; Mahoney, 2007); and/or (3) have a cause which is
salient to the government (Klüver, 2011). In addition, also those who
signal credible threats, e.g. about legal action against government de-
cisions, may successfully convince governments to act in line with their
preferences (Dal Bó, 2006; Schmidt, 2002). Strategic action ﬁeld theory
oﬀers an alternative explanation. It argues that important players who
dominate a ﬁeld (referred to as ‘incumbents’) often have close ties to
the government and are able to enlist its support if their dominance is
threatened (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). A recent example of this is
the European Commission’s response to car makers’ pressure to weaken
emission standards following the Volkswagen Diesel scandal (Neslen,
2015). This would also explain how governments choose which speciﬁc
solutions to support when they intervene out of their own volition. For
example, in the GSM case, national governments supported speciﬁc
solutions that were designed by incumbents in their national tele-
communications industries (Bekkers, 2001; Pelkmans, 2001). Another
example is the competition between accounting standards where sup-
port for US GAAP from important American actors inﬂuenced the US
government’s decision not to endorse IFRS standards (Hail et al., 2010).
Of course, the diﬃculty of invoking government into a standardisation
process is also likely to vary based on national standardisation ‘cultures’
which determine what role governments typically play and how legit-
imate their activities are perceived.
4.3. Timing in multi-mode standardisation
In addition to the combination of standardisation modes that con-
stitute a standardisation process, the timing in which they occur is
another key feature. While government-based standardisation can
occur at any time, successful committee- and market-based standardi-
sation are linked to distinct phases in the standardisation process (see
Table 2). This suggests that elements of these modes can only be used at
certain times and that there is a clear sequence to be followed. Such a
clear sequence can be observed in some multi-mode cases (e.g. Wi-Fi vs.
Home RF – see van den Ende et al., 2012), but this is not always the
case.
Botzem and Dobusch (2012) see standardisation as a recursive
process where each cycle of development and diﬀusion is followed by
another, and events in the previous cycle inﬂuence what happens in the
next cycle. This idea is supported by the Java standardisation case
where a de-facto standard ﬁrst emerged in the market before commit-
tees were involved (Garud et al., 2002). In addition, elements of the
modes may also occur in parallel. The dynamic interactions between
elements of these modes discussed in Section 3.2.1 (see Farrell and
Saloner, 1988; van Wegberg, 2004; Vercoulen and van Wegberg, 1998)
rely on the assumption that elements of market-based and committee-
based standardisation can occur simultaneously, which has been
documented in the Blu-Ray vs. HD-DVD case (see den Uijl and de Vries,
2013). The intensity with which the diﬀerent modes inﬂuence the
process may vary at diﬀerent stages. For example, in the development
of international accounting standards, the government-based mode’s
impact was very pronounced at several key points when governments
passed new rules which impacted on standard development in com-
mittees (see Büthe and Mattli, 2011). During other stages in the process,
government’s role was less pronounced (Büthe and Mattli, 2011).
This implies that there is a large variety in timing of multi-mode
standardisation processes and that elements of the diﬀerent modes can
impact a process in many diﬀerent sequences. Although varying this
sequence from the usual one in a speciﬁc institutional setting is likely to
lead to similar resistance as introducing entirely new modes (see
Section 4.2), this further expands the number of strategic options for
actors in the process. We discuss the consequences of varying the se-
quence of a standardisation process below.
4.4. Interactions between modes in multi-mode standardisation processes
As we already found in existing literature, the modes of standardi-
sation interact with each other dynamically. Within these interactions,
they can fulﬁl diﬀerent functions, such as creating diﬀerent types of
legitimacy (see Botzem and Dobusch, 2012; Tamm Hallström and
Boström, 2010), facilitating agreement among actors with diﬀerent
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interests, building an installed base for a solution, or providing a pro-
cess for ensuring regular updates of the standard.
In this section, we recombine observations from the literature to
generate tentative new insights into these interactions that go beyond
what has been theorised so far. To do so, we consider ways in which
elements of each mode can impact parallel and/or subsequent devel-
opments in other modes. We ﬁrst consider the interactions between the
committee- and market-based modes (Section 4.4.1). Section 4.4.2
discusses the potential impact of the government-based mode in multi-
mode standardisation. Section 4.4.3 examines three-way interactions
that are likely to occur in cases involving all three modes. Table 5
summarises the key points of this section.
4.4.1. Interactions between committees and markets
When there is no government involvement, standards emerge in one
or both of the other modes. We focus on situations involving both
committees and markets. In such cases, committees and markets are
strongly mutually dependent.
Actors in markets may look for guidance from committees regarding
the eventual solution to be chosen as a standard. Although standards
developed in committees are voluntary (e.g. de Vries, 1999; Mattli and
Büthe, 2003), markets often follow committees’ choices of standards
because these decisions signal support by many important players, re-
sulting in a bandwagon eﬀect (e.g. Delcamp and Leiponen, 2014) and
legitimising solutions (Botzem and Dobusch, 2012; Garud et al., 2002;
Tamm Hallström and Boström, 2010). Absence of such clear signals
from committees can lead to very fragmented markets as Meyer (2012,
pp. 134–165) observed in the case of container sizes for European in-
termodal transportation. Failure to reach a decision on a standard in
committees may therefore also contribute to several solutions con-
tinuing to exist in parallel in the market. This is a factor contributing to
no de-facto standard emerging, adding to the ones identiﬁed by
Techatassanasoontorn and Suo (2011) and de Vries et al. (2011).
The voluntary nature of committee-based standards also means that
markets can be used to challenge a standard chosen in a committee if an
actor is dissatisﬁed with it. Once a committee has agreed on a standard,
its actual use and implementation is up to the choices of actors in the
market. Because coordination is only reached if actors use a common
solution, the diﬀusion in the market conﬁrms or overrules the decision
made in a committee. The cases of USB vs. FireWire (van den Ende
et al., 2012) and 2G mobile telecommunications (Funk and Methe,
2001; Gandal et al., 2003; Pelkmans, 2001) show that standards de-
veloped by SDOs can still become one solution competing with others in
a market battle. Support from an SDO may then be a key factor in such a
market battle but is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for emerging as the
common solution.
Since acceptance in the market is eventually decisive for a standard
to reach its goal of coordination, actors in committees can be heavily
inﬂuenced by parallel or earlier developments in the market. A solu-
tion’s installed base sends strong signals of commitment (Blind, 2011;
Egyedi and Koppenhol, 2010; Farrell and Saloner, 1988; Garud et al.,
2002). Committees may also be involved after a de-facto standard has
been chosen in the market to make it acceptable to users who require
high degrees of input legitimacy (e.g. Microsoft in the oﬃce document
Table 5
Interactions between modes.
Impact on In early stages of process In late stages of process
Committee-Based Standardisation Market-Based Standardisation
• Providing guidance to standard users before large-scale implementation• Facilitating agreement between producers, thus avoiding market-battles• Providing the basis for government procurement
• Providing post-hoc input legitimacy for standards chosen in
market
• Building support for challenging established standards• Keeping standard speciﬁcations up-to-date and providing
platform for standard maintenance
Government-Based
Standardisation
• Providing technical speciﬁcations to be referenced in legislation• Providing actors with an avenue for regulatory capture
Market-Based Standardisation Committee-Based
Standardisation
• Signalling commitment to
committees
• Building installed bases for solutions• Challenging standards chosen in committees
Government-Based
Standardisation
• Signalling commitment to
governments
Government-Based Standardisation Committee-Based
Standardisation
In national standardisation:
• Resolving wars of attrition• Creating conditions in favour of proposed solutions• Raising actors’ stakes in committees if committee-based standard could become mandatory
In international standardisation
• Jointly developing international governmental standards
Market-Based Standardisation In national standardisation:
• Resolving wars of attrition• Creating conditions in favour of proposed solutions
In international standardisation:
• Building installed bases in national markets
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format case (Blind, 2011; Egyedi and Koppenhol, 2010) and Sun in the
Java case (Garud et al., 2002)). Furthermore, it is also conceivable that
an actor uses the committee-based mode to build broad support for a
new solution that challenges one which previously emerged as the de-
facto standard.
4.4.2. Interactions involving governments
Governments’ hierarchical position enables them to decide stan-
dardisation processes and resolve wars of attrition if they have legis-
lative power over the entire geographic area for which the standard is
developed. This means that governments choosing and enforcing a so-
lution is decisive, even if this choice is not aligned with other actors’
preferences. This solution will then remain in place unless the gov-
ernment reverses its decision (possibly due to of lobbying).
Not only do governments impact on developments in markets or
committees, the reverse direction of inﬂuence has also been observed.
In several cases, such as GSM (Bekkers, 2001; Pelkmans, 2001), TD-
SCDMA (Gao et al., 2014; Gao, 2014), and the competition between
accounting standards (Hail et al., 2010), speciﬁc government inter-
ventions were reactions to events in the committee- and/or market-
based modes. In addition to such ad-hoc inﬂuences, the literature also
documents two institutionalised ways in which committees’ decisions
have implications for the outcomes of governments’ involvement: (1)
the European “New Approach” (Borraz, 2007) and (2) governments’
preference to refer to committee-based standards in their procurement
(Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Rosen et al., 1988). Such ﬁxed avenues of
inﬂuencing government policy through committee-based standardisa-
tion suggest that multi-mode standardisation opens up avenues for
regulatory capture (see e.g. Dal Bó, 2006; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991).
This is because participating in committees gives more direct inﬂuence
on the outcome of a standardisation process than lobbying govern-
ments, especially in more mature markets (Blind et al., 2017). Blind
et al. (2017) ﬁnd that committee-based standardisation is more prone
to providing a basis for regulatory capture when technological un-
certainty is low. This suggests that this eﬀect also relates to timing.
Standardisation processes often coincide with a technology’s develop-
ment and thus also with decreasing technological uncertainty. Using
committee-based standardisation as a tool to inﬂuence government
policy may therefore be most eﬀective in a standardisation process’s
later stages.
The observations made so far in this section apply to the national
level of standardisation. At the transnational level, actors with hier-
archical positions similar to those of governments rarely exist (the
European Commission being a notable exception). In cases where
governments want to contribute to transnational standardisation, they
can make use of the cooperative or competitive coordination mechan-
isms. Governments can jointly develop standards in international or-
ganisations, such as the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, which develops the Codex Alimentarius food safety
standards), and may then commit themselves to using their hierarchical
position to enforce the resulting standard at the national level (Büthe
and Mattli, 2011, 2010). Alternatively, their interventions in national
markets (through hierarchy or purchasing power – see Edler and
Georghiou, 2007; Funk and Methe, 2001; Rosen et al., 1988) either
directly build a solution’s installed base, or signal that a large installed
base of a solution can be expected to develop in a country. Funk and
Methe (2001) ﬁnd that this may signiﬁcantly impact transnational
standardisation because other governments or actors in committees or
in other countries’ markets may choose a solution which has such an
(expected) installed base.
4.4.3. Interactions between all three modes of standardisation
In addition to these direct interactions between pairs of standardi-
sation modes, activities within one mode of standardisation may also
have a ‘moderating’ eﬀect on the dynamics between the other two
modes. For example, actions by the government can have a direct eﬀect
on committee- and/or market-based standardisation but may also
change the interactions between these two modes. This would further
add to the potential dynamics that occur in multi-mode standardisation.
Extant literature provides two examples of such ‘moderating eﬀects’.
(1) Meyer (2012) argues that the European Commission’s early inter-
vention into the 2G and 3G mobile telecommunication standardisation
prevented interactions between committee- and market-based stan-
dardisation that were observed in the parallel US standardisation pro-
cess. However, other types of government intervention can also raise
actors’ stakes in standardisation and make standardisation processes
more contested (Meyer, 2012). This could potentially lead actors to
engage in committees and markets simultaneously to improve the
chances of their solution emerging as the standard. (2) Governments
often rely on standards which emerge from committees in their pro-
curement (e.g. Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Rosen et al., 1988). In cases
where governments intervene in market battles through procurement,
doing so means that the results of committee-based standardisation also
inﬂuence the interactions between markets and governments.
In addition to a mode inﬂuencing the relationship between the re-
maining two modes, the dynamics of this relationship may also impact
what happens within that mode (i.e. the causality may exist in both
directions). Like the interactions between pairs of modes, these re-
lationships are likely to be reciprocal and potentially highly dynamic.
For example, actors who anticipate that governments will intervene in
market battles may engage in relevant committees to ensure that the
resulting standards reﬂect their preferences (see Blind and Mangelsdorf,
2016). Another example would be government intervening in a stan-
dardisation process in response to interactions between the committee-
and market-based modes which lead to an unsatisfactory result of the
standardisation process, as observed in the case of e-mobility charging
plugs in Europe (see Bakker et al., 2015).
Although these examples on their own cannot be generalised, they
point towards an additional potentially important feature of multi-
mode standardisation that has so far not been documented in the lit-
erature. It is likely that the dynamics in multi-mode standardisation
also include indirect eﬀects, where the activities in one mode aﬀect the
dynamics that unfold between the other two modes and vice versa.
4.5. Multi-mode standardisation as an ongoing process
The ways in which the modes can impact on each other discussed so
far provide actors with a large number of strategic options. Which
options they apply and what impact they have on a standardisation
process depends on their individual strategies. This raises the question,
how to reach a balance among these interactions and which elements
will eventually be decisive for the results.
We can already identify two factors that inﬂuence the relative
importance of the modes in a process: (1) The standardisation ‘culture’
in a country and/or sector is likely to impact on each mode’s im-
portance (see Section 4.1). (2) Actors’ available resources and
knowledge. Eﬀectively participating in market-based standardisation
as a producer requires substantial investments, e.g. in production
capacities or marketing (e.g. den Uijl, 2015; van de Kaa et al., 2011;
see also von Burg, 2001, pp. 78–99). It also requires standard im-
plementers and users who are willing to invest in building up installed
bases and to bear the switching costs in case they made the ‘wrong bet’
(e.g. Belleﬂamme, 2002). Participating in committee-based standar-
disation also requires investments, e.g. costs for experts who can re-
present an actor, but they are usually much lower compared to those
needed for participating in market-based standardisation. The re-
sources and knowledge needed for eﬀectively inﬂuencing the gov-
ernment-based mode are likely to lie in between the other two.
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Lobbying government does not require large investments in produc-
tion facilities but the logic of inﬂuence on the result is less straight-
forward than in committees and the outcomes are more uncertain.
Government- and especially market-based standardisation are there-
fore likely to become relatively more important in a multi-mode
standardisation process if actors are willing and able to spend the
necessary resources and use them eﬀectively.
Neither of these two factors is likely to be static. In the medium- to
long-term, the standardisation ‘culture’ in a ﬁeld can change if it is
challenged by suﬃciently strong actors, or if it needs to adapt to outside
shocks. In the short-term, available resources and knowledge can also
ﬂuctuate, e.g. because actors acquire them or because actors join or
leave the standardisation process. This suggests that the relative
weights of the modes can change throughout the process, as was ob-
served in the development of international accounting standards (see
Büthe and Mattli, 2011).
Such changes and the options to challenge coordination outcomes
identiﬁed above also imply that multi-mode standardisation is poten-
tially indeﬁnitely ongoing, rather than a deﬁnite process as assumed in
the ideal-typical views. Where extant literature already considers
standardisation as an ongoing process, it mainly focuses on eﬀorts in
committees to extend or maintain standards (Botzem and Dobusch,
2012; Egyedi and Blind, 2008; Jain, 2012) or on work in committees to
replace existing standards when technological change makes them ob-
solete (Egyedi and Blind, 2008).
Instead of being the end point to a process, an established standard
is a situation with a short-term equilibrium between the involved ac-
tors, i.e. where, for the time being, no actor attempts to challenge the
status quo. An established standard therefore resembles a settled stra-
tegic action ﬁeld (see Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Such a settlement
can be challenged at any time. The interactions between standardisa-
tion modes discussed above and the potentially shifting weights of the
modes in a standardisation process mean that actors can launch new
activities in one or multiple modes that then may aﬀect on other modes
and the overall standardisation process.
To sum up, standardisation is therefore not only an ongoing process
because standards need to be updated regularly, as already acknowledged in
extant literature, but also because actors may disagree with an established
standard and challenge it. The objective of coordination is thus only reached
if no actor challenges the standard successfully. The success of such activ-
ities is likely to depend on a range of factors, such as the standardisation
‘culture’ in the ﬁeld, the environment in which the standardisation process
takes place, the challenging actor’s resources and knowledge, and other
actors’ willingness to defend the standard.
5. Conclusions and agenda for further research
Standardisation is vital for driving forward the major current trends
related to smart systems and platforms. Due to these systems’ com-
plexity and variety of involved stakeholders, we expect multi-mode
standardisation to become increasingly prevalent. This means that a
better understanding of the phenomenon is needed. Although such
multi-mode standardisation processes can be expected to have case-
speciﬁc dynamics, these dynamics are likely to result from combina-
tions of certain underlying features related to the ideal-typical modes of
standardisation. Our work provides the basis for further research into
these features by adding three major contributions to the literature. (1)
We crystallise the three modes underlying standardisation processes
and their deﬁning characteristics (coordination mechanisms, timing of
coordination, main actors driving the process, avenues of inﬂuence,
inclusiveness in standard development). (2) We provide an overview of
the available literature on the interactions between these modes and
identify its gaps. (3) We recombine the evidence from this literature to
generate tentative insights, beyond what has been documented in lit-
erature so far, into the interactions and dynamics that are likely to
occur in multi-mode standardisation.
These interactions and dynamics are summarised in Fig. 2.9 In ad-
dition to the direct interactions between modes that are already evident
from existing literature, we also expect developments in each mode to
have a reciprocal impact on the dynamics between the other two
modes. Because each mode of standardisation oﬀers an ‘avenue’ for
actors to contribute to a standardisation process, these actors’ actions
drive the dynamics in multi-mode standardisation. Actors can activate
new modes at various points in the process (although this is subject to
limitations related to the ﬁeld’s standardisation ‘culture’ and relies on
their ability to wield suﬃcient inﬂuence over the ﬁeld). Once a mode
has been activated, every actor can decide whether to engage in this
mode and how to use the opportunities for manoeuvring that it oﬀers.
These complex dynamics occur against the backdrop of the ﬁeld’s
standardisation ‘culture’ and institutional context. This backdrop has an
important impact on the degree to which actors can rely on certain
modes of standardisation, whether their activities within the modes are
perceived as legitimate and how the developments within the modes
aﬀect each other. A further element of this backdrop is the technolo-
gical context (which relates both to the technology’s complexity and the
degree of uncertainty of its development) in which the standard is de-
veloped. Compared to the standardisation ‘culture’ and the institutional
context, extant literature oﬀers a weaker base for theorising about the
technological context’s impact on multi-mode standardisation pro-
cesses, making this a ﬁrst area for further research.
These ﬁndings establish the elements that are likely to be key for
multi-mode standardisation processes, and provide a good basis for
further research into this important phenomenon. All the elements in-
cluded in Fig. 2 require further enquiry, as outlined in the agenda for
research in Section 5.1. Furthermore, our ﬁndings already lead to some
recommendations for practitioners, see Section 5.2.
5.1. Implications for theory and agenda for further research
Multi-mode standardisation is likely to shape the dynamics of
standardisation and major technological and social developments in the
future. Theory about standardisation needs to reﬂect this better. We
propose that additional research should approach multi-mode stan-
dardisation from three perspectives: (1) dynamics of multi-mode stan-
dardisation processes and how they contribute to coordination; (2)
strategies for individual actors; and (3) the role of governments and
other facilitating actors like SDOs. Generating an understanding based
on these three perspectives will also provide a foundation for evaluating
the impact of multi-mode standardisation on business and society,
which represents a fourth area of research.
The ﬁrst suggested area for research could look in more detail into
the processes leading to the emergence of new standards. As outlined in
Section 4.3, multi-mode standardisation processes are highly dynamic
but current literature does not provide suﬃcient evidence about the
interactions in these processes. Using a theoretical angle from so-
ciology, such as Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) strategic action ﬁelds,
may help to get a better grasp of these processes. Topics that need to be
considered in this context include the speciﬁc roles that actors can play
(e.g. in terms of designing and selecting solutions), the exact mechan-
isms behind the interactions between modes of standardisation, and the
conditions under which multi-mode standardisation leads to one or
multiple competing standards.
The second area for research could investigate how multi-mode
standardisation aﬀects individual actors and their strategies and how
they drive collective action. This research should aim to understand how
individual actors navigate around these processes to reach their goals.
Engaging in multiple modes gives actors a large number of potential
ways to inﬂuence the standardisation outcome but may also involve
9 Blue lines signify elements that have already been acknowledged in previous litera-
ture. Orange lines represent new elements that arise from our discussion.
P.M. Wiegmann et al. Research Policy 46 (2017) 1370–1386
1382
substantial costs and hurdles. Nevertheless, it remains unclear under
which conditions the beneﬁts of using these possibilities outweigh the
costs. Such research could focus on success factors in multi-mode stan-
dardisation (building on the literature that investigates them in a single-
mode context). Other potentially useful theoretical angles for this topic
include again strategic action ﬁelds (see Fligstein and McAdam, 2012),
focusing on the activities of individual actors within a ﬁeld instead of the
entire ﬁeld’s development; or the resource-based, knowledge-based and
relational views (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Grant, 1996; Lavie, 2006;
Wernerfelt, 1984). It would be particularly interesting to explore which
resources, knowledge, and relationships organisations require to parti-
cipate successfully in multi-mode standardisation.
A third promising avenue of research could focus on the role of
governments and other facilitating actors. As Ho and O’Sullivan (2017)
note, the increasing complexity in standardisation requires actors who
can support standardisation processes. Diverse roles of governments
have been documented (see Sections 3.2 and 4) but a systematic
overview is lacking. As a ﬁrst step, a more complete review of national
strategies towards standardisation is needed. Such research could build
on Tate’s (2001) work. The resulting typology could serve as input for
investigations into the eﬀects of government intervention in multi-
mode standardisation. Topics could include what government activities
best support standardisation processes, whether the outcomes con-
tribute to promoting national industries, and whether government in-
volvement in multi-mode standardisation can promote a country’s po-
sition in international competition. Such research could also consider
non-economic eﬀects, such as how interventions impact large societal
and technological innovations. In addition to looking at the roles of
government in this process, this research could also take into account
other actors, such as SDOs, industry associations or powerful individual
actors (in line with Lessig, 2000; Lessig, 1999 idea that ‘code is law’),
and their contributions to managing and steering multi-mode standar-
disation processes.
Another relevant area of study is the role of diﬀerent modes of
standardisation in regulatory relief. Existing literature identiﬁes
standardisation as a way for business to reduce the burden of regulation
(e.g. Schmidt, 2002; Wätzold et al., 2001) but does not consider the
option of multi-mode standardisation in this context. It would be in-
teresting to investigate how the three modes inﬂuence each other in
setting rules that might replace or complement regulation. In such si-
tuations, the various interactions between government-based standar-
disation and the other modes (see Fig. 2) may provide ample oppor-
tunities for private actors to increase the chances that government
policy reﬂects their special interests. Theories on regulatory capture
(see e.g. Dal Bó, 2006; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991) could therefore pro-
vide a particularly relevant theoretical background for studies related
to these topics.
As mentioned above, developing theory on multi-mode standardi-
sation in this manner would provide a basis for better understanding
the eﬀect of standardisation on large social and technological changes.
Although the literature already acknowledges the need for standardi-
sation to make these large scale innovations happen, the ﬁndings from
the research we outline above might be integrated into theoretical ap-
proaches, such as Geels, 2004; Geels, 2002002) socio-technical transi-
tions. This could help to ﬁnd out how diﬀerent conﬁgurations of stan-
dardisation processes (e.g. in terms of the involved modes, the sequence
in which they get involved, or their contributions’ relative importance
for the process) can support or hinder major change, e.g. by aﬀecting
legitimacy, speed or technological development. In line with Blind
et al.’s (2017) ﬁnding that the eﬀectiveness of individual modes de-
pends on the technological context, such research needs to study multi-
mode standardisation in various technological and institutional set-
tings. The eﬀectiveness with which speciﬁc conﬁgurations of modes can
support or hinder such change is very likely to depend on the context in
which a standardisation process takes place. An analysis of the welfare
implications is also needed. While many academic and non-academic
studies (e.g. Blind, 2004; Blind and Jungmittag, 2008; Swann, 2010)
have already assessed this for single mode standardisation, it remains
unknown whether the developments discussed in this paper make a
diﬀerence in this regard.
Fig. 2. Interactions in multi-mode standardisation.
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5.2. Implications for practice
In addition to the implications for theory building, our results are
also relevant for practice. Anyone who has a stake in the ongoing large
social and technological changes is likely to be aﬀected by the outcome
of standardisation processes which we expect to be or become multi-
modal in many cases. Industrial actors, trade associations, NGOs and
research organisations should therefore all be aware of how standards
emerge.10 If they decide to participate in the process, they should
consider the large variety of options that multi-mode standardisation
oﬀers for their strategies. Activating more than one standardisation
mode (e.g. by lobbying governments to intervene) requires suﬃcient
knowledge and resources. On the other hand, the discussion in Section
4 shows that actors who do so gain a large variety of options to inﬂu-
ence standardisation, some of which only arise at certain stages of the
process. To apply these options as part of a coherent strategy, actors
should be aware of the dynamics that are likely to result from this. Even
if stakeholders decide against activating certain modes, they need to be
prepared for their competitors’ actions. They should consider carefully
whether to follow into new modes, and avoid being blindsided by in-
ﬂuences resulting from modes in which they are not active.
SDOs need to shape their procedures in such a way that they are
responsive to inﬂuences from other modes and attractive for stakeholders
who have the choice between engaging in committee-based standardi-
sation and other modes. They also need to be prepared for intensiﬁed
competition within the committee-based mode, e.g. because SDOs from
other ﬁelds (e.g. ICT) are becoming potentially suitable forums for
standard development, or because of the emergence of new actors like
open-source communities. Strategies to remain relevant in this context
could include managing standardisation projects in such a way that
standards are not only developed and approved but their implementation
is stimulated and supported as well. Moreover, SDOs could emphasise
their strengths, such as being able to facilitate cooperation and agree-
ment among diverse groups of stakeholders, and could focus their con-
tributions where these strengths are most important. For example, SDOs
could promote committee work to deﬁne overarching frameworks and
architectures for new large systems which support activities in the
market to establish standards for the individual elements within them.
Where solutions that meet SDOs’ requirements for a standard have al-
ready emerged in the market, it may be sensible to absorb them into a
formal standard to avoid duplicating eﬀorts, as observed in Section 4.
Similar implications are likely to apply to other organisations which
pursue committee-based standardisation activities, such as communities
of practice or open source communities, and which also need to attract
contributors and ensure that their solutions are widely implemented.
Governmental policymakers can use our ﬁndings in using standar-
disation to support policy and/or when they consider intervening in
standardisation, especially where there are strong opposed interests and
considerable societal implications. Standards that are used to support
policy (e.g. under the “New Approach”) mostly come from formal SDOs
in the committee-based mode. The importance of market-based stan-
dardisation in some areas suggests that governments may also beneﬁt
from incorporating them into their policy, instead of fostering the de-
velopment of new committee-based standards in addition to pre-ex-
isting de-facto standards. Especially in contexts of complex systems,
where standards do not stand alone but need to be aligned, this may
prevent fragmentation. When governments intervene in ongoing stan-
dardisation projects, non-hierarchical intervention is preferable (see
Meyer, 2012), but this requires timely identiﬁcation of the problem.
Hierarchical intervention may therefore be needed as a last resort when
markets and committees are likely to lead to unsatisfactory results.
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